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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note argues that judicial fact construction is an ignored and yet central
issue in any theory of adjudication. Its thesis is this: there is a moment in
judicial fact construction, overlooked in our customary thinking about adjudica-
tion, in which the facts are brought together to constitute a single unified whole.
Attention to this moment of judgment, a judgment I call-borrowing from the
philosopher of history Louis Mink-synoptic judgment, should help fill in a
gap in theorizing about adjudication and enrich the understanding of the
phenomenology of the judging process. No theory of adjudication can aspire
to completeness without an account of how the "actual" facts engendering the
case or controversy become the "fact-pattern" through which the law is applied.
Although it is by now a jurisprudential commonplace (albeit a contested
commonplace) to assert that adjudication is interpretation,' little attention has
been paid to the specifically interpretive activity of fact construction.2 The
struggle among interpretive theories has largely been played out in the arenas
of constitutional and statutory interpretation. The principal purpose of this Note
1. For the idea that adjudication is interpretation, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 87-92 & passim
(1986). But see Cornell, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law as Literature
Movement, 54 TENN. L. REv. 203 (1986).
2. An outstanding exception to this is Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
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is to fix attention on the process of fact construction, the synthetic act of
synoptic judgment. Accordingly, this Note is descriptive rather than advocatory.
Although it may have incidental implications for the longstanding debates
concerning the proper approach to the Constitution,3 the Note's emphasis on
fact construction is intended to be a contribution to our understanding of the
actual process of adjudication. The Note offers not a theory of adjudication,
but an account of a necessary component of that process; given serious atten-
tion, the account may provoke a rethinking of terms in some of the larger
debates about legal interpretation.
First, however, it is necessary to bring into focus that portion of the adjudi-
cative process that remains largely overlooked in theoretical accounts of
judging. The perception of fact construction as a process worthy of attention
and deserving of theorization itself depends largely upon the terms of the
inquiry brought to bear on the problem of adjudication. Whether one regards
the process of fact construction as deserving of theorization at all depends on
whether it is noticed as a problem. As a general matter, it is fair to say that
existing theories of constitutional adjudication do not offer competing (or even
incommensurable) accounts of fact construction. The fact construction process
is not regarded as an object worthy of theoretical scrutiny at all, and thus
remains largely invisible to theories of adjudication.
I want to highlight this oversight by discussing Margaret Jane Radin's
recent restatement of the idea of "The Rule of Law," a concept that is the
cornerstone of much liberal thinking about adjudication. n She writes that "[t]he
3. It may also have implications for more localized jurisprudential debates such as the one concerning
law as an autonomous discipline. See Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60
TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981); Posner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 33 U.
TORONTO L.. 333 (1988) [hereinafter, Posner, Conventionalism]; Posner, The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline, 100 HARV. L. REv. 761 (1987); see also infra text accompanying notes 75-79.
4. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. REv. 781 (1989).
Discussion of the idea of the rule of law is a staple of Anglo-American jurisprudence. J.M. Balkin
captures the idea of the rule of law in terms of its demand that law be "predictable, nonretroactive, and
equally applicable to all citizens." Balkin, The Rule of Law as a Source of Constitutional Change, 6 CONST.
COMMENTARY 21, 21 (1989). Its values are "maximized by constrained interpretation of the Constitution."
Moore, The Constitution as Hard Law, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 51, 66 (1989). Traditionally, the idea of
"the rule of law" has been associated with the idea of decision according to a rule. See Schauer, Rules, the
Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 69, 69 (1989). The idea of adjudication as the
application of rules of deductive reasoning to fact situations was, at least in its Langdellian version,
discredited by Holmes and his Legal Realist epigones. But the desire to constrain judges is a persistent one,
especially in light of the widely shared goals associated with the idea of the rule of law, and should not
be dismissed too lightly. The last 10 years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the idea of constitution-
al interpretive adjudication and a corresponding debate about the hows and whys of judicial guidance. The
debate is often frankly motivated by "rule of law" values and a concomitant desire for interpretive consisten-
cy and rationality.
This debate has typically been dyadic in form, variously opposing interpretivism to noninterpretivism,
originalism to nonoriginalism, and more recently "hard law" to "soft law." Throughout these debates, there
recurs the disposition to identify constitutional adjudication as, at bottom, the application of a constraining
methodology involving rules, or something approximating them.
Frederick Schauer has argued that the central question of constitutional adjudication is just this question
of rules. See Schauer, supra. Shall one (two, or all somehow) of the possible rule-based adjudicative
approaches be implemented as a calculus of constitutional adjudication, or should one (two, or all) of these
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Rule of Law, as it comes down to us in the liberal tradition, is committed to
the model of rules, and this means, under the traditional conception of rules,
that it is committed to traditional formalism."5 Traditional formalism under-
stands the essence of adjudication to consist of the application of a rule to a
particular. Rules apply to particulars in such a way that the particular can be
fitted within the rule. One way of expressing this "is to think that somehow
the applications to particulars are already present in the rule itself."6
Traditional formalism's account of adjudication is relevant here not for the
long-discredited (but nevertheless incessantly condemned) deductive-mechanical
structure it adumbrates, but because in setting out the components of the
adjudicative process (a judge, a rule, a "particular" to which the rule is ap-
plied), it allows us to isolate the central foci of interpretive inquiry in a way
that makes them available for critical inspection. In the rule-of-law model the
judge's role in adjudication is negligible, and beyond interpretive inquiry.7 For
traditional formalism, the question of rules and their interpretation comes into
the foreground 8 and the situations to which the rules are applied remain
opaque. By their very name, "particulars," the facts to which the rules apply,
be utilized only to supplement the freer activities of judges, assisting the judge in arriving at what he thinks
the best outcome?
In spite of other differences, the approaches paired above generally share a common assumption-that
it is possible to appeal to a consistent interpretive standard to secure the interpreted meaning of the Constitu-
tion: text, intention, structure, supervening values, contemporary consensus, the personal philosophy of the
judge, or some ordered combination of these. Furthermore, in adhering to a secure interpretive standard,
interpretive rationality in the form of rough predictability will emerge.
5. Radin, supra note 4, at 796.
6. Id. at 795.
7. Legal Realism has of course made us familiar with the relevance of the idiosyncracies of the
decisionmaker. Though Legal Realism is by now old news, the revelations of Legal Realism still cannot
be reconciled with the rule-of-law conception of the judicial factfinder that dominates so much of our
thinking about interpretation. That model posits a contemporary, but historically unconditioned interpreter
who then chooses from among contexts in which to situate the constitutional text.
While any number of contemporary approaches to interpretation part company with this structural
model, the most helpful, I believe, is that of H.-G. Gadamer. See Linge, Editor's Introduction to H.-G.
GADA ER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS at xlvii (D. Linge ed. & trans. 1976) [hereinafter Linge] ("All
deliberate interpretation takes place on the basis of (human being's] historicity, that is on the basis of a
prereflective understanding of being from within a concrete situation that has intrinsic relation to the
interpreter's past and future."). Gadamer posits an historically conditioned interpreter capable of engaging
a text such as the Constitution because the text itself and the history of its effects are constitutive elements
of the very tradition in and through which the interpreting subject comes to understand. In understanding,
we always understand texts as contextualized in historically conditioned ways. We do not first consult the
text and then elect to place it in a context; rather we encounter it in a dialogue in which its original context,
the history of its interpretations, and our present contexts merge. The understanding interpreter is herself
historical; because she stands within, rather than above the stream of history, she is not free to pick and
choose among contexts or methods that privilege an isolated past or an immediate present. See also infra
notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
8. So, for instance, in the context of constitutional adjudication, a number of options present themselves
as candidates for supplying the rules of adjudication. Among these are some very familiar ones: the
constitutional text itself as the source of rules, the original intention of the Framers and/or ratifiers as the
source of rules, and stare decisis as the source of rules for constitutional decisionmaking.
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are inarticulate, resistant to understanding, for in the language of modem
ontology, "particulars" are ultimate simples, building blocks, atoms.9
A crude model emerges. Constitutional interpretation is typically conceived
as a process in which a judge (or judges) applies the Constitution (and/or a line
of precedental cases) to a new and challenging issue which is grounded in some
factual situation. The issue or fact situation is "held up" before the literal text
of the Constitution (and/or before mediating structures in the form of evidence
of original intent or intervening texts of doctrinal elaboration), and the issue
is decided through the application of the Constitution. Judges may consult the
words of the constitutional text, the intent of the Framers, precedents, values
(enduring or contemporary), or some combination of all of these in order to
arrive at a solution. The model has three parts: the judge, the case or controver-
sy before the court, and the legal standard of review (that is, the text of the
Constitution and as many of the other interpretive guides as are used in a given
case). The process consists of the application by the judge of the interpreted
text(s) to the facts in issue.
But if adjudication is the application of law10 to concrete real-world situa-
tions," then the objects to which they are applied simply cannot be "particu-
lars" in any way approximating the rule-of-law sense. 12 Situations are compos-
9. "[We take [it] to be a fact of human experience... that a particular really is an instance of its
universal." Universals, in 7-8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 197 (P. Edwards ed. 1967) (discussing
Aristotle). A philosophical universal can be thought of in terms of a rule: Any particular object satisfying
the rule becomes an instance of it. See generally UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS (M. Loux ed. 1976)
(discussing perennial philosophical problem of universals and particulars).
10. The perspective offered in this Note challenges not only the reigning characterization of the
components of the adjudicative process, but also its combinational logic. What does it mean to "apply" an
interpretive standard such as a constitutional provision or a statute? Though we think of grasping the thing
to be applied and then, in the next moment, actually applying it, this image misses the way in which the
judge has already begun to interpret, to understand the text, before she consciously begins to apply it to
any particular situation.
11. The companion idea to Gadamer's notion of textual interpretation is his conviction that situations,
present realities, are also always interpreted. The facts of a legal controversy do not stand naked, ready to
be subsumed under a distinct and separate binding instrument called the law. Rather, "[C]ircumstances must
be understood within the law .... L WEINSHE94ER, GADAMER'S HERmENEUTICs 191 (1985); see also
infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
12. Of course we understand this tacitly, but we seldom make the interpretation of factual reality an
object of reflection. A theoretical corollary of the rule-of-law model is that for adjudication there is a
relatively clear-cut difference between facts and texts. Texts like the Constitution and statutes are open to
interpretation; understanding reality, whatever else it may require of us, does not involve interpretation. The
perspective relied upon in this Note argues that there can be no sharp differentiation between the interpreta-
tion of texts and facts. While a number of philosophical perspectives on understanding are available to
underwrite that view, this Note relies on the phenomenological hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. See
supra note 7.
Three interesting discussions of Gadamer's relevance to contemporary debates about legal interpretation
are Eskridge, GadamerlStatutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990); Hoy, Interpreting the Law:
Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL L. REV. 135 (1985); and Phelps & Pitts,
Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological Hermeneutics for Legal Interpretation, 29 ST.
Louis U.LJ. 353 (1985). For Gadamer, understanding a text such as the Constitution can never be either
a matter ofjust consulting the semantic context of the Constitution's origin or of the world of the contempo-
rary interpreter. Interpreting the Constitution involves a joining or fusing of the original context of the text
and the contextual world of the interpreter. Neither context is dispensable and textual meaning can never
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ite, multifaceted, and, in adjudication, contested. Any comprehensive theory of
the adjudicative process must see and account for what is obscured by our
habitual thinking about adjudication: before there can be the application of a
rule to a "particular," "particulars" themselves must emerge as the interpreted
outcome of a process culminating in a particular kind ofjudgment. That process
and judgment constitute the subject of this Note.
The Note explores some of the inadequacies of the "rule-of-law" conception
of adjudication in the context of a particular case, and proposes an alternative
account of the process of judicial fact construction. t3 Part II analyzes the
opinions of the Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,14 looking
first to the different interpretive approaches employed within the case and
second to the variety of outcomes generated by the application of a single
approach, in this case the "endorsement test."15 Part HI attempts to show that
the interpretive quality of adjudicative understanding is such that the hard
distinction between law and fact should be rethought in light of the unavoidable
interpenetration of law and fact. Part IV discusses the act of judgment in and
through which a case or controversy's facts become a legally cognizable fact
pattern. The Note concludes in Part V by linking the species of judgment
involved in fact construction to the "practical wisdom" strain of contemporary
jurisprudence. While most closely related to that mode of theorizing, the
synoptic judgment employed in judicial fact construction deserves a role not
just in one, but in every theory of adjudication aspiring to completeness.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AS METHOD AND AS INTERPRETATION:
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY V. ACLU
This section uses the Allegheny decision to show that the crucial deter-
minants of the cpinions do not come down either to issues of interpretive
methodology or disputes about the "raw facts." Rather, competing premethod-
ological constructions of the fact situation16 played a central role in the dispo-
sition of the case. Competing characterizations of the same raw facts are, in
be reduced to one or the other. The Constitution's meaning emerges in a kind of dialogue in and through
which the interpreter engages the text. Because the Constitution has a history of interpretation, and because,
in interpreting it, we place ourselves within that history, exclusive reliance on either original intent or
contemporary values is, in principle, impossible. See Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/Non-
originalism Distinction, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 479,491-95 (1988) [hereinafter Hoy, Hermeneutical Critique].
13. The Note does not purport to challenge the idea of the rule of law per se, nor does it quarrel with
the rule-of-law values mentioned above. See supra note 4. The Note seeks rather to challenge prevailing
theoretical prejudices concerning the idea of the rule of law, especially insofar as they impede our
understanding of the actual adjudicative process.
14. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
15. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
16. By "premethodological" this Note refers to that stage in the adjudicative process, evidence of which
may or may not appear in the justificatory section of the opinion, at which the controversy takes factual
"shape." Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 226-35 (1960) (discussing importance of
background setting in adjudication).
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turn, possible, not simply because the Justices have distinct political visions,
but because constructions of social fact depend upon tradition-and the tradition
of social understanding of religion in America is itself a sustained argument
among contending voices.
17
A. Two Rule-Oriented Approaches to the Establishment Clause: The Creche
Decision
County of Allegheny v. ACLU's is the latest in a series of decisions by the
Supreme Court attempting to determine the constitutionality of religious sym-
bols placed in public spaces. In a Court marked by strong differences, the Alle-
gheny decision is especially noteworthy for the sharpness of its disagreements
and the rancor of its tone. The decision includes five different opinions, and
there is no single opinion of the Court on the menorah issue.
The case tested the constitutionality of two religious symbols: one, a creche
displayed on the grand staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse in
Pittsburgh; the other, a Chanukah menorah placed just outside the City-County
building in the company of a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held both the creche and menorah
displays unconstitutional; because they failed the test articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 9 they were found impermissible endorsements of religion. By a
5-4 margin, the Supreme Court held the creche an unconstitutional endorsement
of religion; by a 6-3 difference, however, the Court found the menorah a
permissible symbol not having the prohibited effect of endorsing religion.2'
In spite of the decision's five-part cacophony, two basic decision strategies
are discernible. The first is well expressed by Justice Blackmun for the Court
in Part II-A of the decision:
Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or "promotion,"
the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at
17. For a discussion of tradition as being constituted by ongoing dialogue on the subject of the
tradition's own meaning, see A. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 220-25 (198 1). The possibility of conflicting
interpretations of a given tradition, like the possibility of difference in the judicial interpretation of social
reality, is not an enigma and not something to be wished away.
18. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon articulated the most frequently used measure for determining the
constitutionality of a practice challenged on establishment clause grounds:
Under the Lemon analysis, a statute or practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be
permissible under the Establishment Clause, must have a secular purpose; it must neither advance
nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect; and it must not foster an excessive entangle-
ment with religion.
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3100. The endorsement test employed in Allegheny was Justice O'Connor's
adaptation of the second Lemon prong to specific situations.
20. Four Justices voted to reverse the Court of Appeals on both symbols (Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia,
and White). Three Justices voted to affirm the lower court on both symbols (Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor voted with the majority on both symbols, judging the menorah
constitutional and the creche unconstitutional.
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the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position
on questions of religious belief or from "making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political communi-
ty.' 
2 1
The constitutionality of a challenged practice is thus to be determined according
to an endorsement test. If the practice conveys a message that a particular
religion or religious belief is "favored or preferred,"' or if a practice promotes
one religion at the expense of another or at the expense of no religion,' it will
be said to endorse that religion and will therefore be found unconstitutional.
The second method for testing the constitutionality of the symbols is
illustrated in Justice Kennedy's opinion. Dissenting on the issue of the cr~che's
constitutionality, Kennedy rejects the creche majority'se preference for the
application of a doctrinal test and cautions the Court against falling into the trap
of mechanically applying a "formalism that does not exist."s He stresses the
possibility of governmental recognition and accommodation of religion. The
Kennedy approach is exemplified in this statement: "In determining whether
there exists an establishment, or a tendency toward one, we refer to the other
types of church-state contacts that have existed unchallenged throughout our
history, or that have been found permissible in our caselaw." 27 He concluded
that because the Court had in the past upheld the constitutionality of some
creche displays,28 legislative prayer,29 benefits to religious schools20 and
tax exemptions for religious organizations,31 both the creche and menorah
were constitutionally permissible.
In sum, the creche component of the Allegheny decision illustrates a differ-
ence in decisional outcome based upon a difference in decision strategy. For
proponents of a doctrinal test, religious symbols will necessarily fall on either
side of a threshold of impermissibility, depending upon whether the symbol can
21. 109 S. Ct. at 3101 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
22. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
23. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
24. See supra note 20.
25. 109 S. Ct. at 3135 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
26. Justice Kennedy uses the term "accommodation" nontechnically to mean, roughly, "provide a space
for" or "give room to." In recent establishment clause jurisprudence the term had acquired a more technical,
doctrinal sense, referring to governmental action to remove a burden on the free exercise of religion imposed
somehow by the government. See Corporation of Presiding Bishops v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 347-48 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
27. 109 S. Ct. at 3137 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
28. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (creche included in public Christmas display depicting
origins of holiday did not violate establishment clause).
29. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (opening legislative session with prayer not unconstitu-
tional).
30. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state-supported transportation for children to private
schools not unconstitutional).
31. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemption for religious groups
not unconstitutional).
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fairly be said to promote, favor, or endorse one or any religion. For the dissent-
ing four, there is reference to doctrine, but the dispositive factor is history,
where history incorporates both the substantive outcomes of prior constitutional
challenges as well as historically unchallenged practices. For the latter, histori-
cal approach, 2 accepted practices of the past form a kind of constellation. If
the currently challenged practice can be fitted into the overall configuration,
without distorting its overall shape, it will be constitutional.
The creche decision thus presents two different decision strategies (the
doctrinal and the historical) at work in constitutional decisionmaking and, as
one might expect, the two strategies generate conflicting outcomes. As such,
the creche decision illustrates the problematic of interpretation conceived as a
problem of interpretive methodology in constitutional adjudication, and suggests
that if we could settle on the appropriate decisional strategy, such conflicts
might be eliminated.
B. The Menorah Decision and the Breakdown of the Rule-Oriented Approach
The menorah component of the Allegheny decision, however, threatens this
method-centered hope in a fundamental way. For when the creche majority
turns to confront the issue of the menorah, the consensus disintegrates.
If a five-Justice majority agrees about the relevant caselaw, placing the
current controversy in a line from Everson through Lemon and Lynch to the
present, and if that same majority can agree about the result those cases dictate
in the case of creche, how is it that they disagree on the matter of the menorah?
How does a group of Justices demonstrably in agreement on interpretive
methodology,33 and capable of concerted application of that method to the
creche facts, differ so sharply upon the application of relevant doctrine to the
menorah problem?
The answer lies in a fact, very close to the surface of the Allegheny opinion
(and latent in so many other opinions): it is not only a matter of constitutional
interpretive methodology that divides the Justices, but differences in the inter-
pretation of legal and social facts. To see how this is so, one need only look
to opinions of Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and O'Connor on the constitu-
tionality of the menorah.
32. It is important to stress that this is only one of the many ways of using constitutional history.
33. In Allegheny Justice Blackmun combines the Lynch concurrence (of Justice O'Connor) with the
four Lynch dissenters to forge a working "doctrinal" majority, whose approach to establishment issues can
be used as a guide to further challenges. 109 S. CL at 3101-03 ("Thus, despite divergence at the bottom
line, the five Justices in concurrence and dissent in Lynch agreed upon the relevant constitutional principles
[expressed in the endorsement test].").
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1. Justice Blackmun on the Menorah
Commencing his analysis of the menorah issue, Blackmun writes:
[The relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is whether
the combined display of the tree, the sign [placed by the city, saluting
liberty], and the menorah has the effect of endorsing both Christian and
Jewish faiths, or rather simply recognizes that both Christmas and
Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has at-
tained a secular status in our society.34
He finds no endorsement. Though it has religious origins, the tree, he believes,
is a secular symbol. Placed adjacent to the menorah, the forty-five-foot tree
"communicates" a secularity to the eighteen-foot menorah because the tree is
the "predominant element' 35 in the display. Therefore, it is "much more
sensible to interpret the meaning of the menorah in light of the tree, rather than
vice versa.' 36 The incorporation of a sign saluting liberty "confirm[s] that in
particular contexts the government's association with a religious symbol does
not represent the government's sponsorship of religious beliefs." '37 Interpreta-
tion of the menorah's meaning depends not only upon its physical setting; it
must also "take into account the perspective of one who is neither Christian
nor Jewish .... [The constitutionality of its effect must also be judged
according to the standard of a 'reasonable observer.""'3 And to support his
opinion, he rules out the possibility that the combined tree-sign-menorah display
will be understood to endorse Judaism alone. In support of this assertion, he
cites demographic data to the effect that only 45,000 of Pittsburgh's 387,000
residents are Jewish. That Judaism is a minority faith in the region makes a
message of endorsement unlikely (although, he cautions, not impossible in other
circumstances).
2. Justice O'Connor on the Menorah
O'Connor disagrees strongly with what she sees as Blackmun's implied
characterization of the Christmas tree as religious. 39 For her the tree is a
predominantly secular symbol. Consequently, the issue is not whether the
display endorses both religions (the tree could not endorse Christianity) or none.
Rather, it is "whether the City of Pittsburgh's display of the menorah, the
34. Id. at 3113 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
35. Id.
36. Id. at3114.
37. Id. at 3115 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 707 (1984)).
38. Id. (citing Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
39. Blackmun's suggestion that the display endorsed either both faiths or neither faith tacitly assumes
that the tree is in some sense a symbol of Christianity.
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religious symbol of a religious holiday, next to a Christmas tree and a sign
saluting liberty sends a message of government endorsement of Judaism or
whether it sends a message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own
beliefs."''4
Although the menorah is a religious symbol of a religious holiday, its
accompaniment by a sign erected by the city of Pittsburgh saluting liberty
"indicates that the city intended to convey its own distinctive message of
pluralism and freedom. '41 Thus, in interpreting the ultimate message of the
display:
A reasonable observer would, in my view, appreciate that the combined
display is an effort to acknowledge the cultural diversity of our country
and to convey tolerance of different choices in matters of religious
belief or nonbelief by recognizing that the winter holiday season is
celebrated in diverse ways by our citizens. In short, in the holiday
context, this combined display in its particular physical setting conveys
neither an endorsement of Judaism or Christianity nor disapproval of
alternative beliefs, and thus does not have the impermissible effect of
"mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in
the political community."42
3. Justice Brennan's Dissent on the Menorah
Brennan, joined by Marshall and Stevens, judges the menorah unconstitu-
tional. He accuses Blackmun and O'Connor of forgetting their own general
interpretive premise: "that context is all-important in determining the message
conveyed by particular objects."'43 Accordingly, the meaning of the Christmas
tree, in light of its adjacency to the menorah, is primarily religious. As for the
menorah itself, "it is most likely that the religious aspects of the menorah
would be front and center in this display."'
Explicitly addressing the otherwise undiscussed problem of factual interpre-
tation, Brennan writes that he would not presume to say which interpretation
of the tree's significance is the correct one (religious, because adjacent to the
menorah; secular, because generally regarded as such). Without giving any
content to his own "reasonable person" standard, he "shudder[s] to think that
the only 'reasonable observer' is one who shares the particular views on
perspective, spacing, and accent expressed in Justice Blackmun's opinion
.45 He then goes on to state boldly that "the city's erection alongside the
40. 109 S. Ct. at 3122 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor
also disputes Justice Blackmun's emphasis on the secular quality of the Chanukah holiday. Id.
41. Id. at 3123.
42. Id. at 3123-24 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)) (emphasis added).
43. 109 S. Ct. at 3126 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 3127.
45. Id.
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Christmas tree of the symbol of a relatively minor Jewish holiday.., has the
effect of promoting a Christianized version of Judaism."46 The religious values
implicit in the structure of the religions' respective calendars contribute to the
meaning of the display and thus to the meaning of the menorah.
C. The Lesson of Allegheny for Interpretive Adjudication
In Allegheny constitutionality is a matter of endorsement (or lack thereof).
Endorsement is a matter of message. Message is a matter of context. Thus,
answering the endorsement inquiry calls for determining the meaning of the
symbol in the appropriate context. Context is the traditional remedy for indeter-
minacy of meaning. In the Allegheny opinion, however, at least eight different
notions of context are employed to determine meaning.47 Even where there
is agreement as to the most relevant contextual factor, the message is under-
stood differently.48 Since "the question 'whether a government activity com-
municates an endorsement of religion' is 'in large part a legal question to be
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts,' ,49 at least this
particular interpretation of the Constitution necessarily turns upon the "judicial
interpretation of socialfacts." Even when Justices agree about the appropriate
doctrinal mechanism for spelling out the demands of the establishment clause,
its present meaning necessarily turns on more than original text or contempo-
rary doctrine. Its present meaning (and so, the outcome of the case) depends
ultimately on which of the available notions of context provides the solution
to the menorah's true significance. Which is to say, it is the legally relevant
conception of context that is crucial.50 Thus, to answer the endorsement inqui-
46. Id. at 3128-29.
47. These are 1) context as determined by the "physical setting," 109 S. CL at 3123 (O'Connor, I.,
concurring in part) which could be further divided into setting-as-backdrop (the building/property) and setting
as the adjacent symbols; 2) "[t]he absence of a more secular alternative symbol is itself part of the context,"
109 S. Ct. at 3114 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); 3) the total demographic makeup of the Pittsburgh area, 109
S. Ct. at 3113 n.64 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); 4) the overall "holiday context," 109 S.Ct. at 3123 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); 5) context as the way adherents in the community
understand history, 109 S. Ct. at 3127 (Brennan, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 6) undisputed
factual history, e.g., the historical facts of Christ's life, 109 S. Ct. at 3128 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); 7) the relative importance of the symbolized holiday in the calendar of that faith,
109 S. Ct. at 3128-29 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 8) and the history of related
unchallenged practices combined with all those related practices that survived constitutional challenge, 109
S. Ct. at 3137-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
48. Compare Blackmun's claim that the tree communicates a message of secularity to the display, supra
note 35 and accompanying text, with Brennan's claim that the menorah confers a religious nature upon the
very same display, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
49. 109 S. Ct. at 3112 n.60 (opinion of Blackmun, 3.) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693-
94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
50. So, for instance, the menorah inquiry incorporates answers to the questions "Who acted?," "What
message was sent?," "Who was the receiver of the message?." and so on. The answers to these questions
can be distinguished ex post, that is, after the configuration of the total situation is determined, but the
responses are interdefining. One cannot determine the answer to the "what message" question without
determining who the relevant receiver is, and, vice versa. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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ry, the Justices must interpret the social world in light of those factors in it
which are legally salient. But if this is true, the actual process of decision could
never assume the form of an application of a legal rule to a set of facts, because
the relevant facts (the context) are, by reason of their relevance, already legal
facts. It is this fact of adjudication that makes the core of the menorah decision
a judgment and not the application of a rule to a situation.
In adjudication, the judge sees as a judge, and so the configurative integrity
of fact situations is a joint synthesis of fact, law, and judicial understanding.
Though facts can be characterized extralegally (imagine an engineer's or
physicist's account of the raising of the Christmas tree), the judge does not
encounter them prelegally, but rather only upon the terrain of the legal land-
scape. That is why, strictly speaking, it does not make sense to speak of the
application of law to fact without reference to the synthetic act of judgment in
and through which the law is made to shape the facts and the facts to fall under
the law.
Understanding a text such as the Constitution can never be either a matter
of merely consulting the semantic context of the Constitution's origin or of the
world of the contemporary interpreter. Interpreting the Constitution involves
a joining or fusing of the original context of the text and the contextual world
of the interpreter. Neither context is dispensable, and textual meaning can never
be reduced to one or the other. The meaning of the Constitution emerges in a
kind of dialogue in and through which the interpreter engages the text in
relation to the facts of the present controversy.
Thus, where the standard model posits a contemporary, but historically
unconditioned, interpreting subject who then chooses among contexts in which
to situate the constitutional text, the judge is actually a historically conditioned
interpreter capable of engaging a text such as the Constitution because the text
itself and the history of its effects are constitutive elements of the very tradition
in and through which the judge comes to understand. The judge is also capable
of adjudicating fact situations because constitutional adjudication itself is a
discipline, a practice cultivated through progressive familiarization with contest-
ed situations.
As to texts, in understanding them we apprehend them as contextualized
in historically conditioned ways. We do not first consult the text and then elect
to place it in a context; rather we encounter it in a dialogue in which its
original context, the history of its interpretations, and the "raw facts" of the
contested situation merge. And the centerpiece of this confluence is the actual
language of the text itself. The judge occupies a particular historical position
in regard to the text;51 because she stands within, rather than above the stream
51. Cf. Linge, supra note 7, at xv ("The role of the past cannot be restricted merely to supplying the
texts or events that make up the 'objects' of interpretation. As prejudice and tradition, the past also defines
the ground the interpreter occupies when he understands.").
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of history, she is not free to pick and choose among contexts or methods that
privilege an isolated past or an immediate present.
The stage at which the facts emerge in the form of a fact pattern precedes
the application of any interpreting methodology. The application of a methodol-
ogy, however useful, is not interpretive understanding. As with texts, to under-
stand is already to have begun to interpret the facts. There do not exist three
distinct acts-interpreting the text simpliciter, interpreting the facts, and then
applying the one to the other. Another way to express this is to say that situa-
tions are also always interpreted. The facts of a legal controversy do not stand
naked, ready to be subsumed under a distinct binding instrument called the law.
Rather, "[C]ircumstances must be understood within the law .... "I2 In apply-
ing the constitutional clause/doctrinal provision to the facts of a given case
there is a mutuality, an integrated reciprocity. The facts assume salience and
shape in light of their relevance to the interpreted text; the text realizes itself,
becomes meaningful through its application in the particular case.53 The text
cannot be fully understood without reference to facts: there are not two distinct
stages of interpretation, but ultimately one synthesizing judgment.
The exercise of such judgment is an integrative interplay of law and fact,
a practice grounded in the larger web of practices we call judging. That practice
is fully intelligible only within the very tradition the judge reinterprets in the
process ofjudging.s Traditions carry forth legal, social, and political practices
of a generality sufficient to make them shareable, but which must constantly
address themselves to the concrete particulars of new situations. For the inter-
preter situated within a tradition, understanding both law and fact is a practice
in which tacit processes of judgment operate within the present situation and
out of the fund of experience provided by the tradition. The present, in both
the context(s) of textual interpretation, and in the context of the factual situa-
tion, owes its intelligibility to the shaping action of tradition. Because present
contexts are shaped by the past, they always arrive already interpreted. That
52. J. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 11, at 191; see also Linge, supra note 7, at xlvii ("All deliberate
interpretation takes place on the basis of [human being's] historicity, that is on the basis of a prereflective
understanding of being from within a concrete situation that has intrinsic relation to the interpreter's past
and future.").
53. See J. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 11, at 191.
Whenever judgment is necessary ... what a rule means (its interpretation) will be indivisible from
and in part determined by, the instances to which it is applied.. .. [Not only is the general
applied to the particular in the act of judgment, but also the particular is applied to the general.
They supplement and complement one another reciprocally. Such judgment ... requires a
weighing of both... . This is phronesis, the virtue of reflective deliberation that determines right
application.
54. Emphasis on the traditions of shared practice unites otherwise quite different contemporary theorists
(and antitheorists) of constitutional interpretation sometimes called "conventionalists." See, e.g., Kronman,
Alexander Bickel's Philosophy ofPrudence, 94 YALE L.L 1567 (1985) (conservative conventionalism); Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (liberal conventionalism); Fish, Dennis Martinez
and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L. 1773 (1987) (deconstructive conventionalism); see also infra text
accompanying notes 73-77.
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is why present controversies cannot consist of raw facts which order themselves
into fact patterns.
III. SYNOPTIC JUDGMENT IN ADJUDICATION
A. How "Facts" Become "The Facts"
Interpretation of fact is typically thought to occur at the trial court level.
It is a problem then for the primary factfinder (judge or jury); the function of
appellate courts is generally confined to interpreting the law."5 Yet, in Alleghe-
ny, the crucial element in the disposition of the creche issue is the interpretation
of the factual record-a record established below and not seriously questioned
at the Supreme Court.56
Determining the constitutional significance of the menorah is a matter of
judging the meaning it conveys in context. Such judgments are synthetic. In
making the determination, each judge asks (if only implicitly), "What hap-
pened?" Any answer to the factual question, that is any judge-made configura-
tion of the facts, must, in the context of the judicial inquiry into the situation
(e.g. in Allegheny "the controlling endorsement inquiry"), respond to the "what
happened" query in a way that selects from the multiplicity of available charac-
terizations of the facts the interpretation that organizes the relevant facts in light
of the specific inquiry.57 In one synoptic act of synthesis the judge "sees" the
situational totality of the case, and understands it as a unified whole. 8 Refer-
ence to the law does not typically appear in an opinion's account of the facts,
but it is by reference to the law that the facts hang together for this case.
Thus, before there is any final rational accounting, the judge must arrive
at some conclusion about the significance of the facts taken as a whole situa-
tion. Interpreting the facts means arriving at a sense of their significance not
as a concatenation of discrete events, but as an integrated whole. The judgment
in and through which the events are brought together is a synthetic act in which
the facts are arrayed configuratively rather than episodically.9
55. There are instances in which higher courts find facts and review lower court fact determinations.
Generally the reality of factual interpretation is recognized as an issue for the lower courts. See, e.g., J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 74 (1950). For a discussion of higher court review of lower court fact determina-
tions, see Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985).
56. But see 109 S. Ct. at 3096-97 n.29 (Blackmun, I., chiding court of appeals for its reading of record
on menorah issue).
57. The philosopher of history R.G. Collingwood stressed this same phenomenon of understanding in
developing his "logic of question and answer." See L. MINK, MIND, HISTORY, AND DIALECTIC 121-38
(1969).
58. The judicial elaboration of the explanatory rationale is thus an unpacking of a synthesis cognitively
and temporally prior to the justificatory reasoning that appears in the opinion. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
59. For discussion of the difference between events grasped episodically and events grasped
configuratively, see P. RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 64-67, 155-61 (1984).
1808 [Vol. 100: 1795
Fact Construction and Judgment
As the menorah case illustrates, and as Gadamer's phenomenological
hermeneutics suggests, even appellate-level judges are in the business of
interpreting facts-and they are doing it as they interpret the law. The notion
that facts are interpreted, and not self-presenting "bare" facts, is not a new
one.' ° Jerome Frank stressed long ago that "[tihe trial court's facts are not
'data', not something that is 'given'; they are not waiting somewhere, ready
made for the court to discover, to 'find."' 61 This is perhaps most obvious in
the case of a criminal trial in which judges and juries must interpret the ac-
counts of witnesses' remembering (and, so, interpreting for the present) their
past perceptions (themselves interpretations, since they are perspectives on the
events witnessed, not the events themselves).
Frank, however, was not much concerned with higher courts' interpretations
of the facts. "[O]rdinarily, in an upper court, no factfinding problem exists,
because the facts are beyond dispute, having been 'found' by the trial court. 62
Frank does not press his antipositivism far enough. In light of the menorah
case, it seems more faithful to the reality of the interpretive situation to stress
that the constitutional provision (here, the establishment clause) as mediated
through the doctrinal lens (here, the endorsement test) projects itself over the
facts as their interpretive horizon. They become not merely the facts, but the
facts-for-the-inquiry. They "constitute" a unified set because of their inter-
relatedness; and their interrelatedness, far from being merely given, is an
outgrowth of their (the facts, that is) jointly constituting the answer to the
question: What (of constitutional relevance) happened here?
The facts of a given case are therefore potentially meaningful because as
an ensemble they can assume a significance they do not possess as a mere list
of facts. They are related, bound together by the law around which they cluster.
A positivist catalogue of facts could never constitute a fact pattern. Facts in
their interrelatedness, not their discreteness, are intelligible as a comprehensible
whole. "Bare facts" can be added together, but could never "add up" to any-
thing.
But if the facts "add up" to an intelligible, comprehensible pattern, what
can be said, even in general, of that pattern's structure?
B. Kelman and the Interpretation of Facts
Mark Kelman contends that "legal argument has two phases, interpretive
construction and rational rhetoricism."63 For Kelman, interpretive construction
60. Nor, obviously, is it unique to the thought of Gadamer. A signal advantage of the Gadamerian
approach, however, is its emphasis on the way the inquiry of understanding itself shapes, and is shaped by,
the facts in the process of understanding.
61. . FRANK, supra note 55, at 23.
62. Id. at 328. But see id. at 47 ("Even in upper courts, where all the testimony is in writing, the ablest
judges often differ with one another about the facts of a case.").
63. Kelman, supra note 2, at 591.
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involves "processes by which concrete situations are reduced to substantive
legal controversies," 6 both in the shaping of legally cognizable factual situa-
tions and in the framing of the applicable legal rules. "Rational rhetoricism"
is the stuff of legal analysis; "interpretive constructs" set the table for the
rationalization. Kelman's concern is with the operation of these interpretive
constructs in the criminal law, and his purpose is deconstructive. However, the
kind of interpretive construction Kelman adumbrates actually occurs outside
the criminal law as well, and his insights can be put to constructive use in
understanding the adjudicative process in general.
Kelman divides interpretive constructs into two types-conscious and
unconscious. Four "unconscious interpretive constructs" are at work in the
characterization of any fact pattern. First, the events of a given incident can be
framed narrowly or broadly. Second, they can be given a disjoined or unified
account. Third, broader or narrower views of intent may be employed to give
meaning to the action. Fourth, the involved party may himself be viewed
broadly or narrowly.6"
Leaving aside the specific implications of Kelman's theory for the criminal
law, he has clearly outlined certain general modalities by which we characterize
factual situations. Though he nowhere identifies them as such, the constructs
he describes are fundamental devices of narrative form itself. Broad and narrow
time frames correspond to the idea of setting. Disjoined and unified accounts
of events correspond to the idea of plot. Broad and narrow views of intent are
variations of motive. Broad and narrow views of the parties correspond to the
idea of character.
That each of these constructs is a device of narrative form is important
because jointly they constitute a vocabulary of components for understanding
that is neither a mechanical logic of forms nor a mere assemblage of unrelated
units. In his rush to assert the irrationality of "interpretive construction,"
however, Kelman offers no theoretical account of how the constructs interact.
Presumably, he has isolated each modality of interpretive construction from a
situational synthesis; in practice the substantive particulars of any concretely
constructed situation will be interdependent. (That is what is implied by calling
the interpretively constructed synthesis a situation.) Though analytically distin-
guishable, the interpretive constructs are practically interdefining. Notions of
intent implicate ideas of character; ideas of character implicate more or less
unified accounts of action; and so on. Thus, situational construction is not
irrational at all. Neither is it "rational" in the limited sense of being governed
by a rule. Rather, interpretive construction has the intelligible unity of a
dramatic, rather than logical, whole.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 593-96, 600-42.
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Kelman's view suggests that judges construe factual situations as something
like the emplotted wholes we recognize as completed narratives. When some-
thing becomes a case at all, it must, in order to be meaningful, present itself
as a coherent situation, one in which "an ensemble of interrelationships of many
different kinds" is "bodied forth as a single whole."" Since a crucial part of
the judicial task is to bring the facts into legal focus, the judge cannot treat the
facts as historians treat a chronicle, that is, as discrete units, chronologically
arranged. Rather, the judge becomes like the historian proper. He sees the facts
of the case in a posture of retrospective synthesis-one in which "relevance
to the law" is the crucial factor in their being coherent at all.
C. Interpretive Construction as Synoptic Judgment
Thus, the statement of facts is not simply a description of an inert body of
evidence to which the law is just applied. The law already informs the evidence
as the gravitational force pulling just these facts into the field.67 The judgment
in and through which the facts are composed into a "fact pattern" susceptible
of judicial treatment and legal resolution is a distinctive act of the judge. It is
crucial to the rendering of legal decisions. It is a matter of judgment and feature
of judging, an overlooked dimension of practical reasoning.
68
Almost forty years ago, in Courts on Trial, Jerome Frank suggested that
lawyerly treatment of facts could be compared with profit to that of the histori-
an.69 In the light of Kelman's articulation of what I have suggested are the
"narrative" modalities of interpretive construction, consider this observation by
the philosopher of history Louis Mink, addressing the problem of understanding
in history:
[T]he historian deals with complex events in terms of the interrelation-
ship of their constituent events .... Even supposing that all of the facts
of the case are established, there is still the problem of comprehending
them in an act of judgment which manages to hold them together rather
than reviewing them seriatim... . [Historical understanding] is neither
a technique of proof nor an organon of discovery but a type of reflective
judgment.
70
This species of judgment, which Mink calls "synoptic judgment" is by no
means the special activity of historians. It is exercised by the judge who
understandingly integrates submissions of fact into a coherent picture. This act
66. L. MINK, Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument, in HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 198 (B. Fay,
E. Golob & R. Vann eds. 1987).
67. See J. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 11, at 191.
68. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
69. See L FRANK, supra note 55, at 37-40.
70. L. MINK, The Autonomy of Historical Understanding, in HiSToRIcAL UNDERSTANDING, supra note
66, at 77.
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of comprehending judgment is not described in the opinion; it does not appear
anywhere in the decisional text. By its very nature such a judgment could never
be described in a form faithful to its actual happening. Nonetheless, it is an act
of the synthetic legal imagination, disciplined (but not rule-governed) by a fund
of prior legal practice operating through it. It is a component of what some
legal theorists have called "practical reasoning."' 71 It is not a discursive phe-
nomenon, not the concatenating process of fact gathering. Rather, it is judgment
as a type of seeing, seeing the whole of a factual field as constituting a unity
integrated in the light of the applicable law.
That the type of judgment identified above appears nowhere in the legal
opinion should not be surprising. It is an unchangeable fact of language that
linguistic expression must be given linear extendedness. A synthetic judgment
in which a multiplicity is brought into focus as unified whole cannot be de-
scribed in a single word. What can be understood as a unity, can only be
explicated at length. Furthermore, "the opinion has no function of describing
the process of deciding."
72
Synoptic judgment is a stage in the adjudicative process which evades
description; it cannot be part of the opinion's process of justification73 because
it is temporally prior to any justification as the cognitive ground out of which
any legal rationale (presuming a legally/factually coherent situation) must
emerge.
Unlike the judge, the historian, as historian, aims at understanding for its
own sake. Constructing a whole historical narrative and grasping it as a whole
in synoptic judgment is the telos of historical activity. It is oriented toward the
past as its subject. It therefore differs from the synoptic judgment of the judge.
The judge grasps the relevant facts and organizes them in a form that answers
the question "What of legal relevance happened?" For the judge, this activity
is no end, but a stage in a practical process with a double orientation-to the
past for the stuff of the judgment and to the future for its interpretive outcome
and binding effect. Judicial synoptic judgment while reflective (like the
historian's judgment), is not an end in itself, but a stage in a practice: the
"reflective deliberation that determines right application." 74
IV. CONCLUSION
Synoptic judgment of the sort sketched above might be added to that "grab
bag of methods" Richard Posner has identified as belonging to the idea of
71. For discussions of the role of practical wisdom in adjudication see Farber & Frickey, Practical
Reasoning and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1615 (1987); Wellman, Practical Reasoning and
Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45 (1985).
72. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 16, at 131 (emphasis added).
73. Or as Kelman calls it, the process of "rational rhetoricism," supra note 2, at 592.
74. See L WEINSHE1MER, supra note 11, at 191.
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practical reason in recent jurisprudence." Synoptic judgment is not, it must
be underscored, a method, but a way of judging that yields understanding. It
is cultivated by persons, lawyers and judges, trained in the recognition of
legally cognizable fact patterns.
The idea that judges employ synoptic judgment in the construction of
judicially cognizable fact patterns does not mean that "rule-of-law" values of
the sort adumbrated above should be abandoned. Nor does it necessarily call
for the relinquishing of every methodological, rule-based method of dealing
with legal issues. Proponents of rule-based adjudication who have heretofore
bypassed the configurative step in judging, the step in which (through synoptic
judgment) the situation takes shape, must now complicate their own accounts
of judging. Application of rules in adjudication may still have a place. The
point here is that the application of any method is logically posterior to and
cognitively dependent upon synoptic judgment. Not "no method," but rather
"not by method alone" is the teaching of the concept of synoptic judgment.
The argument offered above can be understood as a contribution to what
Posner calls the antireductionist strain of jurisprudential conventionalism.76
The existence of synoptic judgment stands as a counterexample to Posner's
claim that "the skills component of legal training can easily be decomposed into
skills that are not peculiar to law: close reading, careful writing, elementary
logic."7 7 Because Posner's overriding vision of adjudication is one in which
judges apply rules-a vision of law as an "analytic system '' 7 8-he finds the
foregoing list of skills exhaustive. But as a synthetic (as opposed to analytic)
activity, the mode of judgment sketched above necessarily evades any analysis-
based conception of jurisprudence. That, however, does not mean that synoptic
judgment does not exist; rather it suggests that a prescriptively narrow concep-
tion of "legal skill" cannot encompass it.
Latent in Posner's suggestion that "elementary logic" (along with close
reading and writing) is the central skill acquired in legal training (and not so
latent in his conception of a common law in the service of economic efficiency)
is a conception of adjudication as a thoroughly "rationalized" process. In
connection with his work on Max Weber, Professor Kronman has discussed the
insistent post-Enlightenment demand for rationality in understanding. By
rationality, the "claims of reason," Kronman means two things: "first, a demand
75. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 837 (1988). In his discussion of
the "methods of practical reason," Posner stuffs into that grab bag authority, reasoning by analogy,
interpretation, means-ends rationality, tacit knowledge, and the-test-of-time. See id. at 841-58. I say, "might
be added" because practical-wisdom jurisprudence is the place on the current theoretical spectrum where
it is a most likely fit. Actually, the account of judgment involved in fact construction, if correct, ought to
form a part of any complete theory of interpretation.
76. See Posner, Conventionalism, supra note 3, at 338-45.
77. Id. at 341.
78. Id. at 347 ("One problem with prudentialism is that it is a mood rather than an analytic system.").
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for intellectual transparency and second, for calculability."79 The tendency to
divide institutions and activities into the rational and the irrational is, for
Kronman, an unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable, compulsion of the modem
Zeitgeist. Practical wisdom, as a recognized reality and a working ideal, stands
in danger of being swept away in modernity's hyperrationalistic (and, the other
side of the same coin, antirationalistic) current.
This Note has attempted to show that there is something in constitutional
adjudication that evades the demand for transparency and calculability. The
County of Allegheny v. ACLU illustrates that even in the application of a
doctrinal test, there persists an interpretive dimension that eludes adjudicative
formalization. As for transparency, the Note has tried to move constitutional
adjudication in that direction by elucidating a mode of judgment employed in
the comprehension of legally cognizable fact patterns. And as for calculability,
this Note has suggested that synthetic judgment can be unpacked, and in a
limited way described-but it cannot be reduced to a rule. For the proponent
of practical wisdom, this irreducibility is a part of the uniqueness of judgment.
This sketch of synoptic judgment is not likely to satisfy the adjudicative
rationalist. Because judges do not say that they are employing synoptic judg-
ment and because no account of it appears in the judicial opinion, the adjudica-
tive rationalist is likely to regard it as at best irrelevant, at worst nonexistent.
Synoptic judgment's resistance to analytical transparency is part and parcel of
the fact that it is a human ability, a capacity of understanding that eludes full
articulation. And so, for the descriptive theorist of adjudication, fact construc-
tion through synoptic judgment poses a challenge to be accounted for. Finally,
to judges and practitioners, as well as theorists, it is a reminder that, as Karl
Llewellyn wrote, "[t]he only guarantee of judicial wisdom will remain the
judge."80
79. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 874 (1987); see also A. KRONMAN, MAX
WEBER 72-95 (1983) (discussing various senses of "rationality" at work in the thought of Weber).
80. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1934).
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